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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Does the Theft of Major Artwork Act ("TOMAA"), 18
U.S.C. § 668, which imposes federal criminal penalties on one
who "steals or obtains by fraud from the care, custody, or control
of a museum any object of cultural heritage," exceed the authority
vested in Congress to regulate under the Commerce Clause?
II. Were the artifacts stolen from the Galisteo Foundation under
the Foundation's "care, custody, or control" under TOMAA, when
the ordinary and common meaning of the words "care," "custody,"
and "control" speak only to the museum's role in exercising
responsibility over the artifacts; ownership is intentionally not a
requirement for "care, custody, or control" under the Act; and the
Act's legislative history and policies to protect objects of cultural
heritage reflect an intent to include smaller museums that do not
necessarily own their collections?
OPINION BELOW
The United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit's
order and opinion affirming the decision of the district court is
unreported. Bram v. United States, No. 11-1961 (12th Cir. Nov.
14, 2011). The United States District Court for the Central District
of DePaulia's order and opinion rejecting Petitioner-Plaintiff's
arguments is also unreported. Brain v. United States, No. 11-123
(C.D. DeP. 2011).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Twelfth Circuit was entered on November 14, 2011. On November
17, 2011, this Court granted Petitioner's writ of certiorari. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 18 U.S.C. § 668.
552
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STATUTORY PROVISION
The Theft of Major Artwork Act, 18 U.S.C. § 668, imposing
federal criminal penalties on one who "steals or obtains by fraud
from the care, custody, or control of a museum any object of
cultural heritage," is reproduced in the Appendix of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ms. THURSDAY BRAM'S CONVICTION
Ms. Thursday Brain worked for Mr. Maxwell Smith as his
secretary and occasional housekeeper of the Galisteo House for
approximately nine years before she was convicted of three counts
of theft of an object of cultural heritage from a museum, in
violation of the Theft of Major Artwork Act ("TOMAA"). R. at 1,
2, 4. Ms. Bram also undertook occasional curatorial duties,
including the cataloguing of Mr. Smith's collection, housed within
the Foundation's Galisteo House. Id. at 4. Additionally, Ms. Brain
sometimes escorted visitors around the grounds of Galisteo House.
Id. In June 2008, Ms. Brain admitted to stealing five missing items
during July and August 2007-while Mr. Smith was on an
extended trip abroad-after Mr. Smith caught her in the act of
removing a pair of skis used on a 1911 expedition to the South
Pole. Id. at 5. All five of the stolen artifacts were found in Ms.
Brain's cottage and private cabin. Id. She was charged for the theft
of a letter from Friar Marcos de Niza, dated 1539; a scrimshaw
whale's tooth fashioned by James Adolphus Bute during Charles
Darwin's voyage of the HMS Beagle; and an updated wall map of
the United States by Osgood Carleton, with possible ties to the
Lewis and Clark expedition." Id. at 4-5. Prior to trial, Ms. Brain
stipulated that she knew that each of these objects was over 100
years in age and was valued over $5,000. Id. at 5. The District
Court convicted Ms. Brain under TOMAA and sentenced her to
thirty-three months of imprisonment, to be followed by twenty-
four months of supervised release. Id. The Twelfth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's ruling, finding Ms. Brain's
Commerce Clause challenge to be without merit and that the
553
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Galisteo Foundation had care, custody, and control of the stolen
objects of cultural heritage. Id. 12, 16.
GALISTEO HOUSE AND FOUNDATION
Mr. Smith was a distant relative of Andr6 Wolenski, the
renowned French architect who built the Galisteo House between
1908 and 1910. Id. at 2. Wolenski was a proponent of the
modernist architecture movement and mentored the world-famous
architect Le Corbusier, a pioneer of Modern architecture
(International style). Id. Wolenski's Galisteo House is the only
example of his architecture this side of the Mississippi River. Id.
Mr. Smith, an architect in his own right-he designed the
DePaulia city opera house-purchased Galisteo House in 1997.
Id. Although he considered the House a "private retreat and
dramatic space" to display his collection of over 200 artifacts, he
formed the Galisteo Foundation in 1999 as a nonprofit, educational
corporation. Id. at 2-3. Mr. Smith transferred ownership of
Galisteo House, its grounds, and fixtures to the Foundation, while
he continued to live there. Id. at 3. The Galisteo Foundation's
purpose "is to educate the public about, and commemorate, one of
the 2 0 th century's most important architects, Andr6 Wolenski,
through the display of the home he designed and in which he
lived." Id. Mr. Smith, as director of the Foundation, hired staff to
help operate the Galisteo House including: a part-time property
manager; a part-time gardener; and Ms. Brain. Id. at 4. Staff duties
included maintaining the house and grounds and providing
walking tours of the House, grounds, and collection. Id.
Additionally, Mr. Smith prepared the Galisteo House and
grounds for opening to the public by purchasing signage,
plantings, and paper goods from merchants all over the country. Id.
at 3. An out-of-state engineering firm built the accommodations
that Mr. Smith had designed to accommodate visitors with
disabilities and an architectural restoration team from outside of
DePaulia completed minor work on the House. Id. Since its
opening, the Galisteo House and grounds have been open to the
public one weekend per month. Id. The Foundation also provides
special tours upon request. Id. Visitors, both in-state and out-of-
state, are drawn not only to the house and grounds, but also to the
554
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unique, private collection on display within the Galisteo House. Id.
3-4.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Both challenges to Petitioner Thursday Bram's ("Ms. Brain")
conviction under TOMAA should be rejected and this Court
should affirm the Twelfth Circuit's decision. Pursuant to Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, Congress has
the authority to regulate Commerce among the several states. This
power enables Congress to regulate instrumentalities of interstate
commerce or regulate those activities that have a substantial
relation to interstate commerce. TOMAA is a permissible exercise
of Congress' Commerce Clause authority when analyzed under
either rationale.
Non-profit entities, such as museums, play a significant role
within national economic activity. As a museum, the Galisteo
Foundation engages in interstate commerce because it provides a
broad range of cultural, social, and educational activities to both
in-state and out-of-state visitors. The museum is similar to
churches and camps that this Court has stated are instrumentalities
of interstate commerce.
The Galisteo Foundation meets the statutory definition of
"museum." The legislative background of TOMAA illustrates
Congress' intent to include institutions, such as the Galisteo
Foundation, within the statutory definition of museum. The
purpose of TOMAA is to address the serious problems of art theft
within the United States, and the Twelfth Circuit's decision
reflects Congress' goal in punishing those who put America's
cultural heritage in danger.
Alternatively, Congress has the authority to enact TOMAA
because stolen historical and artistic objects have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. A statute will satisfy this
"substantial effects" test (1) where intrastate economic activity,
when viewed in the aggregate, substantially effects interstate
commerce, or (2) where the statute contains a jurisdictional
element which would ensure through case-by-case inquiry, that the
activity in question affects interstate commerce. The stolen art
market depends on art theft to exist, and so Congress' regulation of
555
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art theft is not only rational, but necessary to deter this black
market. Without a prohibition on art theft itself, the regulatory
scheme designed to curb the industry for stolen art would have
little practical effect. In enacting TOMAA Congress simply sought
to regulate an illegal market by criminalizing the conduct that fuels
this market.
TOMAA contains a jurisdictional element which ensures the
government will only prosecute thefts which affect interstate
commerce under it. TOMAA only applies to museums that engage
in "activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce." This
reveals that Congress specifically intended to prosecute those who
steal artwork or artifacts from institutions such as the Galisteo
Foundation.
Also, TOMAA's ordinary usage of "care, custody, or control"
speaks only to the role that a museum undertakes in exercising
responsibility for the objects, guarding and preserving the objects,
and having ownership over the objects. The rule of lenity is not
triggered here because TOMAA's text, structure, and history do
not leave ambiguity. Any perceived ambiguity is not significant
enough to invoke the rule of lenity. The objects stolen are related
to the Foundation's purpose, despite the lower court's dissent,
which mischaracterizes the facts. It is not necessary for the
Galisteo Foundation to own the stolen objects in order for the
artifacts to be under the Foundation's "care, custody, or control."
The Act's legislative history indicates that this statute was
enacted to combat the theft of artifacts situated in museums
without regard to specific ownership of such artifacts. Moreover,
the Twelfth Circuit's reasoning coincides with professional
museum policy advanced and endorsed by the American
Association of Museums. Museums rarely own all of the works
they exhibit because borrowing objects allows museums to provide
more comprehensive exhibits for the public's benefit. According to
the American Association of Museum's guidelines, the
Foundation's mission need not specifically state each type of
object that may be displayed to meet its broad aims.
556
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ARGUMENT
I. THE THEFT OF MAJOR ARTWORK ACT ("TOMAA") IS
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE.
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court confirmed the
three categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the
Commerce Clause: (1) it may "regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce;" (2) it is "empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things
in interstate commerce;" and (3) it may "regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." 514 U.S.
549, 558-59 (1995). When Congress acts within the first two
categories, "it is not bound to regulate only activities that have a
substantial relation to interstate commerce." United States v. Al-
Zubaidy, 283 F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 2002). Because the Galisteo
Foundation qualifies as an instrumentality of interstate commerce,
TOMAA is constitutional under the Commerce Clause.
Furthermore, the conduct regulated by TOMAA has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. When viewed in the
aggregate, the regulated conduct substantially affects interstate
commerce. Additionally, TOMAA includes a jurisdictional
element that ensures the government will only prosecute thefts
which affect interstate commerce.
A. The Theft of Major Artwork Act Is Permissible Under Lopez's
Second Prong Of Commerce Clause Authority.
1. The Galisteo Foundation qualifies as an instrumentality of
interstate commerce.
Under the Commerce Clause, "Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce . .
. even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities."
Pierce Cnty., Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003) (quoting
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558). The power of Congress to regulate the
instrumentalities of commerce includes the power to prohibit their
use for harmful purposes, even if the targeted harm itself occurs
outside the flow of commerce and is purely local in nature. See S.
557
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Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 32 (1911) (upholding
amendments to Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles used in
intrastate commerce).
The term "instrumentalities of interstate commerce" has been
defined as "the people and things themselves moving in
commerce." United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir.
2005). The term "instrumentalities of interstate commerce" also
has been defined as "the means by which people or things in
commerce move." United States v. Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp.
2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003). The term includes automobiles, airplanes,
boats, railroads, pagers, telephones, mobile or cellular phones,
including cellular telephone identification numbers and account
numbers, the Internet, and shipments of goods. See Ballinger, 395
F.3d at 1218; Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 723; see also
United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 1984 (2009); United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that telephones, even when used
intrastate, are instrumentalities of interstate commerce); Utah
Lighthouse Ministry v. Found for Apologetic Info. and Research,
527 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding the Internet is generally
an instrumentality of interstate commerce).
Congress has the authority to protect commerce by requiring
that "the agencies of interstate commerce not be used in such
manner as to cripple, retard or destroy it." Houston, East & West
Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 232 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (holding
that the Commerce Clause permitted the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) to control intrastate shipping rates to the extent
necessary to prevent injurious discrimination against interstate
traffic). Since Congress has the power to regulate interstate
carriers as instruments of interstate commerce, this "necessarily
embraces the right to control their operations in all matters having
such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the
control is essential or appropriate." Id. at 351.
The Lopez Court cited two federal statutes to illustrate Congress'
ability to regulate the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce or
persons or things in commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (noting
that 18 U.S.C. § 32, which regulates the destruction of aircraft
employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce, and 18
U.S.C. § 659, which regulates thefts from interstate shipments,
558
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both regulate a "person or thing in commerce"). Similarly,
TOMAA is a permissive regulation under the second prong of
Lopez because a museum is an instrumentality of interstate
commerce. R. at 20. (Kingston, J., dissenting) (noting that an
instrumentality of interstate commerce is the condition, quality, or
fact of serving as a means or agency of interstate commerce).
The Commerce Clause applies to charitable and non-profit
entities. United States v. Grassie, 237 F.3d 1199, 1209 (10th Cir.
2001). A non-profit institution, such as the Galisteo Foundation,
can qualify as an instrumentality of interstate commerce. See
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520
U.S. 564, 585, (1997) (noting that museums are an instrumentality
of interstate commerce whether they generate significant earnings
or are operated by not-for-profit corporations); see also Henry B.
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835,
859 (1980) (noting that museums and libraries account for a
sizable and growing share of our nation's economic activity). Non-
profit entities play such a significant role within national economic
activity that states are forbidden to use tax exemptions for non-
profit institutions as a way to favor local citizens. See Camps 520
U.S. at 587-88 (noting that protectionism, whether targeted at for-
profit entities or serving to encourage nonprofits to keep their
efforts close to home, is forbidden under the dormant Commerce
Clause). The Galisteo Foundation is similar to churches and camps
that serve as instrumentalities of interstate commerce. See Grassie,
237 F.3d at 1204 (noting that churches have been found to engage
in interstate commerce by providing for "a broad range of
religious, cultural, social, recreational, welfare, educational and
financial activities"). Like other non-profit entities, the essential
purpose of the Galisteo Foundation is to educate the public and
commemorate one of the twentieth century's most important
architects, Andr6 Wolenski.
The museum's business necessarily involves interstate
commerce because the Foundation purchased signage, plantings,
and paper goods from businesses located throughout the United
States. R. at 3; see Grassie, 237 F.3d at 1204 (holding that a
church's activity affected interstate commerce because it was open
to the public, and there was a constant flow of information, money,
travel, and purchase and delivery of goods back and forth across
559
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state lines). Similar to the church's purchasing of a wide variety of
office, teaching, and recreational equipment in interstate
commerce in Grassie, the Galisteo Foundation utilized an out-of-
state architectural restoration team and an engineering firm to
make improvements on the museum. R. at 3. Because the activities
of the Galisteo Foundation necessarily involve interstate
commerce, the Galisteo Foundation qualifies as an instrumentality
of interstate commerce that Congress may permissibly regulate
under TOMAA.
2. The Galisteo Foundation meets the statutory definition of
museum.
The Galisteo Foundation clearly fits the statutory definition of a
museum under TOMAA. The Act defines a museum as
an organized and permanent institution, the
activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce, that-{A) is situated in the United
States; (B) is established for an essentially
educational or aesthetic purpose; (C) has a
professional staff; and (D) owns, utilizes, and cares
for tangible objects that are exhibited to the public
on a regular schedule.
18 U.S.C. § 668(a)(1)(A)-(D). The Galisteo Foundation is
situated in the United States and was established as a nonprofit,
educational entity with a purpose "to educate the public about, and
commemorate, one of the 2 0 th century's most important architects,
Andr6 Wolenski, through the display of the home he designed and
in which he lived." R. at 3. The Foundation's purpose is thus both
educational and aesthetic under this statute. Additionally, the
Foundation employs a professional staff consisting of three
persons who maintain the Galisteo House, provide educational
walking tours, maintain the grounds, and catalogue items. See R. at
4. Further, the Foundation owns the Galisteo House and grounds,
and also utilizes and cares for the tangible objects displayed within
the Foundation's property. See R. at 2-5.
560
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Because the Galisteo Foundation fits within Congress' definition
of a museum, it is unnecessary for the court to avoid deciding on
the constitutional issue. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 849-50 (noting that
when a choice must be made between two readings of what
conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before
choosing the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should
have spoken in language that is clear and definite). "Where a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave
and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of
which such questions are avoided, the Court's duty is to adopt the
latter." Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 849 (2000) (holding
that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial
purpose does not qualify as "property used in interstate or foreign
commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign
commerce" within meaning of the federal arson statute).
In contrast, TOMAA is not applied to a private residence
because Mr. Smith transferred ownership of Galisteo House, its
fixtures, and its surrounding grounds to the Foundation. Although
Mr. Smith continues to reside at the Foundation, the grounds have
been open to both in-state and out-of-state visitors since July 1999.
See United States v. Pritchard, 346 F.3d 469, 473 (3d Cir. 2003)
(noting that a historical mansion was established for an educational
or aesthetic purpose because it was a tourist attraction that drew
visitors from around the country); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (holding regulation of motels
serving interstate travelers an acceptable regulation of interstate
commerce).
Unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be
deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance in
the prosecution of crimes. Jones, 529 U.S. at 850. The legislative
background of TOMAA illustrates Congress' intent to address the
serious problem of art thefts and to punish those who assault
America's cultural heritage by depriving the country of these great
works. TOMAA was enacted in 1994 as part of an omnibus crime
bill, which represented a federal response to address art theft. R. at
9. The Court would be not be required to pile "inference upon
inference," in order to conclude that Congress intended the
Galisteo Foundation to be included within the statutory definition
of museum. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
561
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The Galisteo Foundation has a professional staff and utilizes and
cares for tangible objects that are exhibited to the public on a
regular schedule. There are also special tours available upon
application. See R. at 3. Since July 1999, a part-time property
manager has maintained the House and provides educational
walking tours of the property to visitors. Other staff includes a
part-time gardener, who maintains the grounds, and a personal
secretary and occasional housekeeper. The Foundation displays
and cares for the artifacts that are exhibited to the public on a
regular basis, specifically one weekend every month. The main
attraction is the Galisteo House itself, which Andr6 Wolenski
designed between 1908 and 1910. See Pritchard, 346 F.3d at 475
(holding that the Hunt-Phelan Home Foundation qualified as a
museum because the house itself was an object of great historical
and aesthetic significance and was the primary exhibit on the
property). The garden is another "tangible object" that the
Foundation owns and exhibits. One can reasonably conclude that
the professional staff and Mr. Smith care for the six-acre garden in
order to maintain its aesthetic appeal to visitors.
Because "requiring a museum to own all of the objects it
displays would place many of the country's greatest art museums
outside the protection of the statute," it is irrelevant that Mr. Smith
did not transfer ownership of his extensive collection artifacts. See
Pritchard, 346 F.3d at 473; see also R. at 2. Similar to how the
Third Circuit in Pritchard did not require the Hunt-Phelan Home
Foundation to own the stolen object, TOMAA does not require the
Galisteo Foundation to own the stolen artifacts in order for the
Foundation to qualify as a museum. See Pritchard, 346 F.3d at 474
(noting these institutions are museums whether or not the donor
families owned the objects displayed, or whether they had
transferred title to the objects to an independent entity).
Since no single museum could contain "all objects of admiration
and understanding, museums have traditionally exhibited not only
objects from their own collections but also objects borrowed from
other museums and from private individuals." Pritchard, 346 F.3d
at 474. Because the Galisteo Foundation constitutes a museum
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 668(a)(1), it qualifies as an instrumentality
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B. TOMAA Is A Constitutional Exercise Of Congress'Power
Under The Commerce Clause Because The Regulated Conduct
Has A Substantial Effect On Interstate Commerce.
Under Lopez, "Congress' commerce authority includes the
power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce." 514 U.S. at 558-59. A statute will satisfy
this "substantial effects" test of Lopez (1) where intrastate
economic activity, when viewed in the aggregate, substantially
effects interstate commerce, or (2) where the statute contains a
"jurisdictional element which would ensure through case-by-case
inquiry, that the [criminal activity] in question affects interstate
commerce." See id. at 559, 561. Here, the regulated activity in
question relates to a national market for stolen historical and
artistic objects, increases the costs of art both locally and
nationally, and affects the market for art insurance nationally.
Furthermore, the statute contains a jurisdictional element, ensuring
that it is only used to prosecute thefts that affect interstate
commerce.
1. TOMAA regulates a criminal activity which, when viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
Under the third prong of Lopez, Congress can regulate activities
which, when viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate
commerce under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 561. In
determining this effect, the Court need only determine whether
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that such activity,
taken in the aggregate, has an effect on interstate commerce.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
This Court held that Congress cannot regulate non-economic
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect
on interstate commerce in both Lopez and United States v.
Morrison. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560; see also Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 618 (2000). In Lopez, the Court invalidated a federal law
prohibiting the possession of a firearm within one thousand feet of
a school. See 514 U.S. at 551. The Court found that the statute
"has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
563
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enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms." Id. at
559. Nor was it "essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless
the intrastate activity were regulated." Id. at 559. For gun
possession to relate to interstate commerce, the Court would have
to "pile inference upon inference" and sustaining the law would
result in a general federal police power. See id at 567.
Later, in Morrison, the Court invalidated a federal law giving a
civil remedy to victims of gender-motivated violence, reasoning
that if Congress was able to use the aggregated economic effect of
violent crime on interstate commerce to pass federal anti-crime
laws, it could supersede state law in virtually every area of law.
See 529 U.S. at 615. The Court rejected the government's
argument because it sought "to follow the but-for causal chain
from the initial occurrence of violent crime [...] to every attenuated
effect upon interstate commerce." Id.
In both Lopez and Morrison, the Court invalidated the laws
based on concerns "that Congress might use the Commerce Clause
to completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between
national and local authority." See id; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
Here, however, the regulated conduct directly affects interstate
commerce, and without "piling inference upon inference."
Furthermore, unlike the criminal conduct regulated by the statutes
in Lopez and Morrison, the act of theft produces a marketable
good to the criminal, and is thus economical in nature. The stolen
art market depends on art theft to exist, and so Congress'
regulation of art theft is not only rational, but necessary to deter
this black market. Without a prohibition on art theft itself, the
regulatory scheme designed to curb the industry for stolen art
would have little practical effect.
The Court examined another regulatory effort to curb an illegal
market in Gonzales v. Raich. In Gonzales, a group of California
marijuana growers, growing legally under a California law, sued to
enjoin the enforcement of a Federal law prohibiting the growth of
marijuana nationally. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 7. The Court
distinguished the case from Lopez due to the fact that the regulated
activity was economic activity, albeit illegal economic activity,
and because the regulation in Gonzales was merely one of many
"essential part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
564
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which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated." Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 23-25
(quoting Lopez 514 U.S. at 549).
The Court ultimately concluded that "Congress had a rational
basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate
manufacture [...] of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the
[federal act]." Gonzales, 514 U.S. at 22. Without criminalizing art
theft, the interstate market for stolen art would thrive and the
larger regulatory scheme in which TOMAA was enacted would
have a "gaping hole" similar to that in Gonzales. "Prohibiting the
intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a
rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in
that product." Id. at 26.
Given the national market for stolen historical artifacts,
Congress had a rational basis to conclude that localized theft of art
would affect interstate commerce. The market for stolen art is the
third most lucrative criminal activity in the world, behind the drug
and arms trafficking, with profits between two and six billion
dollars annually. See Frank Browning, Stolen Fine Art: Organized
Crime's New Commodity?, NPR.org (May 31, 2007),
http://www.npr.org/templates/ story/story.php?storyld=10588693
[hereinafter Stolen Fine Art].
This market affects interstate commerce by affecting the price of
art and art insurance. Stolen art pieces typically are sold for prices
much less than their legal auction value. See Stolen Fine Art.
Furthermore, theft of objects of cultural heritage increases demand
for insurance for such pieces, increasing profits to national
insurance companies and museums' expenses. See Goran Mijuk,
Demand for Insurance on Art Increases, Wall St. J. (Jun. 5, 2008),
http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB 121260605636245893.html.
Considering both the market for stolen art and the increased
demand for insurance, Congress had a rational basis for
concluding that a federal law criminalizing local thefts would
reduce the interstate market for the pieces. In enacting TOMAA
Congress simply sought to regulate an illegal market by
criminalizing the conduct that fuels this market.
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2. TOMAA contains ajurisdictional element which ensures that
the government will only prosecute thefts which affect
interstate commerce.
A criminal statute will be sustained under the Commerce Clause
if it contains a "jurisdictional element which would ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the [regulated activity] in
question affects interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
Here, unlike the statutes in Lopez and Morrison, TOMAA includes
the requirement that the museum from which the objects are stolen
be one "the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce." This requirement limits TOMAA so as to not regulate
all thefts, or even all art thefts. Rather TOMAA only regulates the
limited category of art thefts from museums that take part in
interstate or foreign commerce.
The Court previously construed a similar jurisdictional element
broadly in Russell v. United States, and distinguished that case
from Jones v. United States. In both cases, defendants were
charged with arson under a statute making it a federal crime to
damage or destroy "any property used in interstate or foreign
commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign
commerce." See Jones, 529 U.S. at 851; Russell v. United States,
471 U.S 848, 859 (2000). At issue in both cases was whether the
buildings damaged, both private residences, fell under the purview
of the statute. In Russell, the building damaged was used as a
rental property, whereas in Jones, it was the private residence of
the owner. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 859; Jones 529 U.S. at 854.
In Jones, the Court rejected the government's argument that the
jurisdictional element of the federal statute should be construed to
include private residences and held that Congress did not intend to
make every case of arson a federal crime. See 529 U.S. at 858-59.
The Court in Russell recognized "that the local rental of an
apartment unit is merely an element of a much broader commercial
market in rental properties" and thus found the law constitutional
due to the rental property's effect on interstate commerce. Russell,
471 U.S. at 862.
In Russell, the Court did not require evidence of an actual effect
of arson on interstate commerce. Rather, the existence of the
broader interstate real estate market was sufficient for the Court to
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conclude that interstate commerce was affected. See id. at 861. The
Galisteo House operates with a more concrete connection to
interstate commerce. It serves the educational and cultural needs of
people from not just in DePaulia, but nationally. See R. at 4. The
house is open to the public, and, although simultaneously used as a
private residence, is owned by the Galisteo Foundation, a
nonprofit, educational foundation. See R. at 3. The house is visited
by tourists from across state lines, advertises nationally, and has
employed interstate businesses to complete modifications and
repairs for the grounds. See R. at 3. Notably, the Third Circuit in
United States v. Pritchard reasoned that the museum in that case
was "engaged in activities which affect interstate commerce . . .
[because it] was a tourist attraction that drew visitors from around
the country." 346 F.3d 469, 472, n.3 (citing Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)).
By including the jurisdictional element in TOMAA, Congress
ensured that the statute would never be applied in a situation that
did not affect interstate commerce. This element distinguishes
TOMAA from the statutes overturned in Lopez and Morrison, and
includes such institutions as the Galisteo House.
II. THE STOLEN ARTIFACTS WERE UNDER THE GALISTEO
FOUNDATION'S CARE, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL;
THEREFORE, MS. BRAM'S CONVICTION FALLS UNDER
THE PURVIEW OF THE THEFT OF MAJOR ARTWORK ACT
("TOMAA").
This Court should affirm the Twelfth Circuit's holding that Ms.
Brain's conviction falls under TOMAA because she knowingly
stole objects of cultural heritage that were under the Galisteo
Foundation's care, custody, and control. Under the Act
[a] person who-(1) steals or obtains by fraud from
the care, custody, or control of a museum any
object of cultural heritage; or (2) knowing that an
object of cultural heritage has been stolen or
obtained by fraud, if in fact the object was stolen or
obtained from the care, custody, or control of a
museum (whether or not that fact is known to the
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person), receives, conceals, exhibits, or disposes of
the object, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
not more than 10 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 668(b)(1)-(2). The statute's ordinary language
requires that the object of cultural heritage be stolen or obtained by
fraud from the "care, custody, or control" of a museum. See id.
The Twelfth Circuit properly analyzed the statute's plain language
to find that 'care, custody, or control' speaks to the role that the
museum undertakes in exercising its responsibility for the objects,
guarding and preserving the objects, and having power over the
objects." R. at 14-15. The Twelfth Circuit also correctly applied
Pritchard to find that the Galisteo Foundation was not required to
own the stolen objects in order for the objects to be within the
Foundation's care, custody, or control. Id. at 15. See also
Pritchard, 346 F.3d at 469 (reasoning that the "statute does not
require the stolen object to be owned by the museum itself. . . .
Once it is established that an institution is a museum, any object of
cultural heritage stolen from the museum's 'care, custody, or
control' will give rise to criminal liability under § 668").
Therefore, ownership of a stolen object of cultural heritage is not
required when such an object is stolen from a museum. The
Galisteo Foundation clearly fits the statutory definition of a
museum under the Act.
The Twelfth Circuit's conclusion that the Galisteo Foundation
had care, custody, and control of the stolen objects furthers sound
policies to protect objects of cultural heritage. For example, the
Twelfth Circuit's reasoning corresponds with the congressional
intent found in the TOMAA's legislative history. See R. at 9; see
also Pritchard, 346 F.3d at 474 (explaining the Act's
congressional intent to protect borrowed cultural objects in
museums). The Twelfth Circuit's reasoning also aligns with
professional museum policy endorsed by the American
Association of Museums. See R. at 16; see also Pritchard, 346
F.3d at 474 (explaining the American Association of Museums's
role in endorsing the protection of borrowed cultural objects in
museums). Therefore, this Court should affirm the Twelfth Circuit
and hold that the stolen objects in question were under the care,
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custody, and control of the Galisteo Foundation-a museum
within the definition of the TOMAA.
A. The Twelfth Circuit Correctly Applied Well-Established
Principles Of Statutory Construction To Find That The Galisteo
Foundation Had Care, Custody, And Control Over The Objects In
Question.
The court below analyzed the common and ordinary meaning of
"care, custody, or control," to yield a sound result. The Act's
ordinary and common meaning is apparent from its intentional
language. The legislature intentionally refused to include a
reference to ownership within the context of the Act's "care,
custody, or control" provision. Any perceived ambiguity of the
meaning of "care, custody, or control" (which does not exist) is not
egregious enough to evoke the rule of lenity. Other courts
concerned with the theft of cultural objects mentioned the rule of
lenity, but did not strictly apply it. The statutory language only
requires one of the conditions of "care, custody, or control" to be
met, yet the Foundation meets all three of these conditions. See R.
at 16, n.6. The dissent's analogy accusing the Act of producing
absurd results is misplaced and goes against the statutory cannon
against absurd results. The dissent also mischaracterizes the facts
by arguing that "care, custody, or control" means that the stolen
objects must relate specifically to the educational or aesthetic
purpose of the museum. Even when assuming that the stolen
objects must relate to the educational or aesthetic purpose of the
museum, the stolen artifacts here relate to the Galisteo
Foundation's purpose.
1. The Twelfth Circuit fittingly determined the ordinary and
common meaning of "care, custody, or control".
This Court should follow the Twelfth Circuit's interpretation of
the ordinary meaning of "care, custody, or control." This Court has
reasoned that when there is not a clear intent to the contrary, a
statute's ordinary language must be construed as conclusive. See
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)
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(internal citations omitted) (reasoning that "unless otherwise
defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning").
The Twelfth Circuit utilized Webster's Third New International
Dictionary to define the common and ordinary meaning of the
words "care," "custody," and "control." See R. at 14 (summarizing
that "care" meant supervision and maintenance; "custody" meant
temporary charge; and "control" meant to have power over). The
Galisteo Foundation maintains, supervises, and manages the house
and grounds-including the artifacts displayed in the house. See R.
at 3-4 (Hired staff collectively operated the Galisteo House and
Foundation.). The Galisteo Foundation also has temporary charge
over the objects. Maxwell Smith had left the objects on display in
the Galisteo House while he was away on a trip. See id. at 4. The
facts also state that the two of the three stolen artifacts "had been
located in areas of Galisteo House that are accessible to the
public." See id at 5. Additionally, the Galisteo Foundation has
control over the artifacts that includes and goes beyond basic
ingress/egress of the Galisteo House. The Foundation controlled
the operating hours of the Galisteo House, including the overall
policy of the House's operating hours. See id. at 3-4. In other
words, the public can only access the Galisteo House and artifacts
displayed and stored therein according to the hours, management,
and policy set forth by the Galisteo Foundation. Therefore, the
Twelfth Circuit soundly concluded that the common usage of
"'care, custody, or control,' speaks to the role that the museum
undertakes in exercising responsibility for the objects, guarding
and preserving the objects, and having power over the objects." R.
at 14-15.
2. Even if this Court finds some ambiguity in the meaning of
"care, custody, or control, "-which there is not-any
perceived ambiguity is not severe enough to invoke the rule of
lenity.
The rule of lenity is a substantive rule of statutory construction
that reasons that ambiguous criminal statutes must be construed in
favor of the accused. See Norman J. Singer & J.S. Shambie Singer,
3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59:4 (7th ed. 2011).
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However, this Court has not applied this rule uniformly across
criminal cases. In United States v. Granderson, this Court
reasoned that "where text, structure, and history fail to establish
that the government's position is unambiguously correct," courts
should "apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in [the
accused's] favor. 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994). In Muscarello v. United
States, this Court reasoned that "the simple existence of some
statutory ambiguity . . . is not sufficient to warrant application of
the rule, for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree," and the
statute must have a "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty" to trigger
the rule of lenity. 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998) (concluding that
the contemporary meaning of "carry" was sufficient to include
carrying a firearm in a vehicle).
In the present case, the Court's Granderson reasoning does not
trigger the rule of lenity. The Act's text, structure, and history do
not leave ambiguity. The statutory text's ordinary meaning
illustrates that "care, custody, or control" applies to the
Foundation's responsibility for and power over the artifacts, not
the specific ownership of each object. Furthermore, another, more
applicable cannon of statutory construction states that the express
mention of one thing excludes all others (expression unius est
exclusion alterius). 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 129. In other words,
items not listed are not meant to be included in the statute. Here,
the legislature could have listed the words "owned by" or
"ownership" to the "care, custody, or control" provision to
explicitly require a museum to own objects protected under the
Act. However, the legislature did not intend this result in TOMAA.
The legislature has included the term "ownership" in at least one
other criminal statute that lists "care, custody, or control." See 18
U.S.C. § 666 (prohibiting the theft, embezzlement, and fraud of
property that "is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control
of such organization, government, or agency . . . ."); see also 18
U.S.C. § 2113(b) (prohibiting the theft of "any property or money
or any other thing of value exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in
the care custody, or control . . . of any bank, credit union, or any
savings and loan association . . . .") (emphasis added). Congress
clearly meant to include ownership as a specific and possible
prerequisite for the stolen property at issue in both § 666 and §
2113(b). However, Congress deliberately chose not to include any
571
21
Garrod et al.: 2012 Cultural Heritage Moot Court Competition Best Brief
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ. ART, TECH. &IPLAW [Vol.XXII:551
specific reference to ownership within the "care, custody, or
control" provision of § 668. Therefore, the differences between §§
666, 2113(b), and 668-the former two including "owned by" or
"belonging to" along with "care, custody, or control" and the later
with only "care, custody, or control"-illustrate that Congress's
intentional silence about an ownership requirement here does not
result in any ambiguity or invocation of the rule of lenity
according to Granderson. Also, these criminal statutes show that
the concept of ownership, e.g. "owned by" or "belonging to" is
separate from the concept of "care, custody, or control."
Moreover, the rule of lenity is not triggered here because the Act
does not contain a "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty" according
to Muscarello. "Care, custody, or control" can be fairly discerned
from the words' contemporary meaning and legislative intent.
Further, a justification for the rule of lenity is fundamental
fairness. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)
(lenity rule motivated by principle of fair warning). Here, Ms.
Brain stipulated that she knew the three artifacts in question were
over 100 years in age and valued over $5,000 each. R. at 5. Ms.
Brain, as a long-time employee of this cultural Foundation and
occasional custodian of the collection housed therein, had
sufficient notice that these artifacts were objects of cultural
significance and that the theft of such objects would be punished
as such. Therefore, this case does not present a grave danger of
failing to give the accused notice of the nature of her crimes and
does not implicate a violation of fundamental fairness.
Furthermore, other courts that have ruled in cases similar to the
present case did not strictly apply the rule of lenity. In Pritchard,
the Third Circuit mentioned the rule of lenity, but found instead
that the statutory definition of "museum" requiring a museum to
own, utilize, and care for exhibited objects was met by the fact that
the Hunt-Phelan Foundation owned the Hunt-Phelan Home
itself-the Foundation was not required to own the objects
displayed inside to fall within the statutory definition of
"museum." See 346 F.3d at 475. In United States v. Gerber, the
Seventh Circuit also mentioned the rule of lenity but rejected the
defendant's argument that the statute at issue was limited to
archaeological objects removed only from federal or tribal lands-
finding instead that the statute did not apply only to such lands. 99
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F.2d 1112, 1115-16 (7th Cir. 1993). Thus, when cultural objects
are at issue, courts are generally reluctant to apply the rule of
lenity to statutory construction.
The dissent's analogy claiming that the Act leads to absurd
results is misplaced. The dissent extrapolated that a museum
patron who checked jewelry into a museum cloakroom could
hypothetically fall under this Act if the jewelry were to be stolen.
R. at 27. A patron who checks a coat or other exclusive property
on such a temporary basis is not intentionally connected with a
museum's "care, custody, and control" in the same manner as an
object on display, on loan, or more permanently housed within the
museum. The stolen artifacts in the present case, however, were
deeply connected with the Foundation. Maxwell Smith, the
founder of the Galisteo Foundation, intentionally displayed his
collection there as part of the Foundation's visitor experience and
left the artifacts there during his own absence. The items were on
display for an indefinite amount of time. Thus, the dissent's
analogy goes against common sense and the substantive statutory
cannon of avoiding absurdity in interpreting statutes. See 73 Am.
Jur. 2d Statutes § 172. The legislature did not intend the absurd
result of including coat-checked items as objects under the
museum's "care, custody, or control."
Furthermore, the dissent's argument that, as contemplated by
law, stolen objects under the Act must relate to the educational or
aesthetic purpose of the museum misstates the law and
mischaracterizes the facts. Here, the dissent attempts to draw a
bright line-even though it accuses the majority of doing so-by
interpreting the statute to mean that the stolen artifacts cannot be
under the Foundation's "care, custody, or control" because Smith
owns the artifacts and these artifacts are unrelated to the life of
Andr6 Wolenski (and consequently the Foundation's purpose).
This argument mischaracterizes the law because, as stated above,
the stolen artifacts need not be owned by the Foundation. Also, the
dissent's use of Gerber is mistaken because although the court
required the stolen artifacts in Gerber to be archaeological artifacts
under the statute, the court did not read the statute so narrowly to
require liability only for objects taken from federal or tribal lands.
999 F.2d at 1115-16 (concluding that § 420ee(c) "is not limited to
objects removed from federal and Indian lands").
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In addition, the dissent mischaracterizes the facts because the
stolen artifacts are related to the Foundation's purpose. Museums
and historical sites often borrow and display objects that only
generally relate to their missions and/or help place their displays
within some interpretive context and further their aesthetic aims.
See The Accreditation Commission's Expectations Regarding
Collections Stewardship, AAM (effective January 1, 2005),
http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/accred/upload/
Collections%20Stewardship%20ACE%20%282005%29.pdf
("[M]useums may have diverse types of collections categorized by
different levels of purpose and use-permanent, educational,
archival, research, study, to name a few-that may have different
management and care needs."). The items stolen are representative
of the type of items that could be found in a historic home of this
stature. The de Niza letter, whale's tooth, and map all are items
that a renowned architect could have amassed and displayed in his
home during the early twentieth century. Wolenski's connection
with the globally-renowned architect Le Corbusier further
amplifies this possibility. It was not uncommon during the early
twentieth century for those with ample means to build homes and
display collections therein that attested to their wealth. See About
the Museum, Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum,
http://www.gardnermuseum.org/about/historyand architecture
(last visited Jan. 1, 2012) (Gardner amassed her personal collection
and then opened her museum in 1903 and friends noted "the entire
museum was a work of art in itself. Individual objects became part
of a rich, complex and intensely personal setting."). Thus it is
within the bounds of the Foundation's interpretive prerogatives to
display such items as part of its purpose. Smith and his collection
are further related to the Foundation's purpose. Smith created the
Foundation. He, like the owner in Pritchard, is related in some
way to the origins of the historic house in question. Smith is a
distant relative of Wolenski and a renowned architect himself
(Smith designed DePaulia City opera house). See R. at 2; see also
Pritchard, 346 F.3d at 470 (Day inherited Hunt-Phelan Home).
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B. The Twelfth Circuit Correctly Reasoned That The Galisteo
Foundation Was Not Required To Own The Stolen Objects In
Order To Exercise "Care, Custody, Or Control" Over Them.
TOMAA does not require the Foundation to own the stolen
objects in order for them to be under the Foundation's "care,
custody, or control" and trigger Ms. Brain's liability under this
statute. In Pritchard, a case factually similar to the present case,
the Third Circuit reasoned that
requiring that a "museum" own all of the objects it
displays would place many of the country's greatest
art museums outside the protection of the statute...
. [A] strict ownership requirement would exclude
"museums" created by individuals to house their
private collections . . . at least as long as the
collections remained in the hands of a private
owner. Most would view these institutions as
museums whether or not the donor families owned
the objects displayed, or whether they had
transferred title to the objects to an independent
entity.
346 F.3d at 473-74. In Pritchard, the founder of the Hunt-
Phelan Foundation personally owned the collections displayed
within the Hunt-Phelan Home. See id. at 471. Although the Hunt-
Phelan Foundation owned the Home, the Hunt-Phelan
Foundation's founder (Day) owned the collection (and
consequently the stolen artifact at issue). See id. Likewise,
Maxwell Smith founded the Galisteo Foundation. See R. at 3.
Similarly, the Foundation owns the Galisteo House and Smith
owns the collection displayed (and the objects stolen). See id In
Pritchard, the Third Circuit did not find that Day's personal
ownership of the collection displayed within the Hunt-Phelan
Home proscribed liability to the defendant under § 668. See
Pritchard, 346 F.3d at 475.
The Third Circuit in Pritchard also concluded that because the
Hunt-Phelan Foundation owned the Hunt-Phelan Home and met
the other statutory requirements within the statutory definition of a
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museum, "the wrongful taking of an object under [the museum's]
'care, custody, or control' is theft from a museum, no matter who
owns the object taken." Id. (concluding that "[o]nce it is
established that an institution is a museum, any object of cultural
heritage stolen from the museum's 'care, custody, or control' will
give rise to criminal liability under § 668"). Ms. Brain does not
challenge the Galisteo Foundation's status as a museum.
Moreover, the Galisteo Foundation clearly qualifies under the
statutory definition of a museum. See supra at 9-12. Because the
Galisteo Foundation is a museum under the statutory definition,
objects stolen from its "care, custody, or control" fall under the
purview of the Act. The Third Circuit did not reason that the "care,
custody, or control" requirement had anything to do with
ownership. Thus it is rational to conclude that the Third Circuit
would not read such a requirement into the Act.
The definition of "care, custody, or control" has been considered
in other contexts to show that it is a separate concept from
ownership. For example, general liability insurance policies
usually exclude from coverage property that is in the "care,
custody, or control" of the insured and such an exclusion is meant
to apply when the insured has physical control, but not necessarily
ownership of, the property in question. See Monari v. Surfside
Boat Club, Inc., 469 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1972). Separate policies exist
to cover objects that are merely in the "care, custody, or control"
of others. See Horse Insurance 101: Care, Custody, & Control,
Equine Law Blog (May 12, 2010)
http://equinelaw.alisonrowe.com/2010/05/articles/insurance/horse-
insurance-101-care-custody-control/ (Special "care, custody, or
control" policies are available to those who board, train, or race
horses but do not own them). Museums generally maintain "wall-
to-wall" coverage, protecting artifacts from the time they leave a
lender's wall, through transit and exhibit to the time the artifacts
are returned to the lender. See Loaning Art to Museums and
Cultural Institutions, Chubb, https://www.chubb.com/
cpiebcontent/cpihomepage/pdf/2010424 LoaningtoMuseums.pdf
(last visited Jan. 6, 2012). The specific treatment given to property
that is within the "care, custody, or control" versus that which the
insured clearly owns further illustrates the separability between
"care, custody, or control" and ownership.
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C. The Twelfth Circuit's Conclusion That The Galisteo
Foundation Had Care, Custody, And Control Of The Stolen
Objects Coincides With Legislative History, Purpose, And Policies
To Protect Objects Of Cultural Heritage.
1. The Twelfth Circuit's reasoning coincides with the
congressional intent found in the TOMAA's legislative
history.
The Act's legislative history indicates that this statute was
enacted to combat the theft of artifacts situated in museums
without regard to specific ownership of such artifacts. Senator
Edward Kennedy made significant remarks regarding stolen
artworks when offering an amendment to a bill containing similar
language to the Act. He remarked that the legislation "is an
important step toward addressing the serious problem of art thefts
and punishing those who assault our cultural heritage by depriving
us of these great works." 137 Cong. Rec. S9088 (June, 28, 1991
(statement of Sen.Kennedy). His remarks included "smaller and
lesser established museums and galleries." Id. Notably, Senator
Kennedy also offered articles to the Congressional Record
concerning the 1990 theft from the Isabella Stewart Gardner
Museum. See id. at S9088-90. The Third Circuit in Pritchard felt
that this legislative history connected smatler museums that did not
necessarily own their collections with TOMAA:
Indeed, it appears that Congress had this precise
scenario in mind when it originally crafted § 668.
What would become § 668 was originally
introduced as an amendment to the Violent Crime
Control Act in 1991 by Senator Edward Kennedy,
together with Senator Orrin Hatch. The amendment
was offered, at least in part, in response to the
infamous multi-million dollar theft from the
Isabella Stuart Gardner Museum . . . . Congress
enacted the amendment section in substantially
similar form in 1994 . . . . It would be surprising if
the statute did not include independent institutions,
like the Gardner Museum, founded by a single
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individual whose collections partially consist (or
consisted) of that person's private collection.
346 F.3d at 474 (internal citations omitted).
Therefore, Senator Kennedy was concerned with the problem of
the theft of artwork and artifacts of cultural heritage. He included
smaller museums-museums like the Galisteo Foundation-within
this realm of needed protection. The Galisteo Foundation is
comparable in size and origin to the Isabella Stewart Gardner
Museum. Both museums began from personal collections amassed
by one individual and were purposefully displayed in more
intimate, homelike environments.
2. The Twelfth Circuit's reasoning coincides with professional
museum policy advanced and endorsed by the American
Association ofMuseums.
Museums generally have mechanisms in place to handle the fact
that they have artifacts that they do not own but that are within
their "care, custody, or control." An interpretation of the Act that
recognizes these facts makes sense and corresponds with the Act's
legislative history to protect all artifacts museums exercise special
responsibility over. The American Association of Museums
administers nationwide standards and best practices for museums.
See Standards, AAM, http://www.aam-us.org/aboutmuseums/
standards/stbp.cfm (last visited Jan. 1, 2012). Museums can
become accredited by following guidelines advanced by the
American Association of Museums. See id. These guidelines
illustrate that museums rarely own all of the works they exhibit,
often do not exhibit all of the works they house, and develop
policies regarding the care of such artifacts:
Since no single museum contains, or could contain,
all objects worthy of admiration and understanding,
museums have traditionally exhibited not only
objects from their own collections but also objects
borrowed from other museums and from private
individuals and organizations. Borrowing objects
allows museums to provide more comprehensive
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exhibits and to make objects accessible that would
otherwise be seen only by a few.
Guidelines for Exhibiting Borrowed Objects, AAM (July 2000),
http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/ethics/borrowb.cfm.
Such guidelines encourage museums to create collections policies,
collecting policies, and interpretation plans. See The Accreditation
Commission's Expectations Regarding Collections Stewardship,
supra at 24.
Specifically, accredited museums have mission statements that
"should state what the museum does, for whom, and why." The
Accreditation Commission's Expectations Regarding Institutional
Mission Statements, AAM (effective Jan. 1, 2005),
http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/accred/upload/Mission
%20ACE%20%282005%29.pdf. The Foundation's stated purpose
shows that it educates the public about Andr6 Wolenski through
his historic home. R. at 3. The Foundation operates for the public
and it does so to commemorate one of the past century's "most
important architects." Id. According to the American Association
of Museums's guidelines, the Foundation's mission need not
specifically state each type of collection or object that may be
displayed to meet its broad aims. The common practice of
developing policies to care for and exhibit objects that museums
merely have custody of further supports the Twelfth Circuit's
reasoning that Congress meant for the Act to protect artifacts that
museums exercise responsibility and special care over, no matter
who owns them.
Therefore, this Court should affirm the Twelfth Circuit and hold
that Bram's conviction falls under the purview of the Theft of
Major Artwork Act because the Galisteo Foundation had care,
custody, and control of the stolen artifacts.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court must affirm the





1. DePaul University College of Law hosts the National Cultural Heritage
Moot Court Competition each year. In recognition of the excellence of the
competitors, the Journal of Art, Technology, and Intellectual Property Law is
pleased to print the 2012 problem, along with the winning brief. The team from
New York Law School, Sarah Garrod, Connie Gibilaro, and Mark Wheeler,
took home Best Brief honors in 2012. Please note that the Table of Authorities
and Table of Contents for this brief have been omitted.
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